Art. 20.012 was added to the CCP in 1995 to require the recording of interrogation of a person accused or suspected and provides for the state's attorney to maintain possession of the recording, and art. 20.02 was amended to prevent disclosure of the recording except for certain purposes. What was the reasoning behind these provisions in the amendment? Under 20.02(d) it appears the recording is made exclusively for the benefit of the defendant. Yet, it would seem that the defendant's statement should be available as evidence against him under Tex.R.Evid. 801 (e)(2)(A), or in any event to impeach the defendant if he testifies. The code originally provided for secrecy of grand jury deliberations (and not necessarily testimony before a grand jury). See Euresti, 769 S.W.2d at 579-80; but see Stern, 869 S.W.2d at 621. Furthermore, at least prior to 1995, the code was uniformly interpreted to permit a defendant's grand jury testimony to be used as stated above by the State. See Hines, 39 S.W. at 936 and Wisdom, 61 S.W. 926; Medlock, 1 S.W.2d at 311-12. Anyone know whether these cases are still "good law"? The bill analysis for SB1074 (75th) says: "This bill would simply codify current case law and practice," and added " the bill would not hinder prosecutors in doing their jobs ..." If the amendment changed Medlock and Hines I have to disagree and wonder why a suspect's grand jury testimony was effectively not made binding upon him. I would certainly like to avoid the fate of Mr. Stern, but at the same time wonder whether an admission before the grand jury can be offered "after the purpose of secrecy has been effected, and it becomes necessary to the attainment of justice and the vindication of truth and right".

Why not just get a court order releasing the grand jury testimony from the secrecy requirement and protect yourself?

That is perhaps a way to protect oneself against the type claim leveled against Stern. But, what if the Court says the State has no standing to request a disclosure or that there are no other exceptions to disclosure than those specified in 20.02(g)? It still seems the interpretation of the amended language of the statute may be a bridge to be crossed.

Martin, I have enough real problems to solve without trying to imagine some more. I have never had a situation in which I feared getting accused of improper release of grand jury testimony, and I don't think a judge would deny a reasonable request for such an order.