We are dealing with a person who has been stealing money from a nonprofit group as far back as 2001. Are we stuck with the five-year SOL for theft and prosecuting (and asking for restitution) for the preceding five years? On the other hand, can we aggregate the offense as far back as 2001 because they were "pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct?"

Any thoughts or insight would me much appreciated!

You might start here:

848 S.W.2d 885
Court of Appeals of Texas,
Houston (14th Dist.).
Victor VITIELLO, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

The Penal Code contains a specific section for numerous incidents of theft arising out of continuous course of conduct. Under TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.09 (Vernon 1989), two or more incidents of theft may be considered as a single offense, and the amounts of each separate incident of theft aggregated in determining the amount of the offense. Section 31.09 creates an offense that is separate from the underlying incidents of theft. Graves v. State, 795 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). In Graves, the defendant was charged with eighteen different incidents of misdemeanor theft, aggregated into one offense under TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.09. Although the two year statute of limitations had run as to each of the individual misdemeanor offenses, the court of criminal appeals held that the five year statute of limitations applied. Graves at 187.
The appellant points out a distinction between Graves and the present case. In Graves, the State aggregated misdemeanor offenses to prosecute the appellant for felony theft. All of the incidents occurred within the five year limitations period for felony theft. In the present case, the State aggregated seven third degree felonies into one second degree felony. One of the incidents of theft occurred outside the five year limitations period. Nonetheless, TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.09 allows the State to aggregate the separate incidents of theft into a single offense. Graves at 187; Brown v. State, 640 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). The Graves decision held that § 31.09 “creates a separate offense and defines conduct for purposes of jurisdiction, punishment and period of limitation from prosecution.” Graves at 187 *888 (emphasis added). Since the offense, comprised of the separate incidents of theft, was not completed until November of 1987, the prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations. We overrule the appellant's third point of error.

But my favorite part of the opinion:

Under these facts, the characterization of the appellant as a fool was a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence. The appellant testified that it would have been “foolish” to use his own name, his own car, and his own insurance policy in committing one of the thefts. The prosecution argued that he did just that. Under the appellant's version of the facts, he participated in the alleged thefts as a self proclaimed investigator. If he truly believed he could conduct his own “investigation” for roughly two years, without reporting these activities to the police, the term “fool” was not inappropriate. See McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23, 37 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270, 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935, 98 S.Ct. 422, 54 L.Ed.2d 294 (1977).

The SOL for aggregate theft starts to run on the date the last theft is committed. See Tita v. State, 267 SW3d 33, 35 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Graves v. State, 795 SW2d 185, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).