Some courts accept a guilty plea but then re-set the case for imposition of sentence (or final approval of the recommended punishment). Most often this is done to permit preparation of a PSI. Sometimes the defendant fails to appear for sentencing. Once re-arrested, the issue becomes whether the State is still bound to make the bargained-for recommendation. I thought one way to avoid the problem was to condition the recommendation on re-appearance (but still take advantage of the plea). I guess that was wrong. Moore. Does this opinion conflict with other decisions? Should it not have been published, in any event?
A very creative bargain. Of course, if the State thinks there is a likelihood that the defendant will (a) commit a crime or (b) flee before sentencing, why allow that to even happen?
Over and over, we see cases on which a judge resets a case in which a defendant is likely to receive a substantial prison sentence, only to discover that the defendant fails to appear or uses his free time for one last crime spree.
The concept of a defendant "getting his life together" before going to prison just doesn't fly. I only wish a documentary crew could follow one of these guys around and show the world what really happens. Human behavior is not changed by posting a bond.
One has to wonder why we have a system of appearances in court based upon a defendant promising to appear or pay a particular amount of money. What is there in the typical felony case that makes us think that a defendant's misconduct will be suppressed by the threat of a loss of a few dollars, especially when those dollars are usually not his own?
Isn't this type of agreement the same thing as a bargained-for waiver of the right to withdraw the plea? Is the court saying that the defendant's right to withdraw his plea cannot be waived?
It seems to me that the court is correct, the defendant has entered into a contract. But the court missed the fact that part of the contract was that the defendant not commit any crimes while out on bond, and the defendant's contractually agreed-upon remedy for that was to be subject to the full range of punishment, rather than the state's initial recommendation.
I don't understand the court's objection to an agreement like this one.
Posts: 622 | Location: San Marcos | Registered: November 13, 2003
Okay so the the court is ruling that the promise to appear and the promise to commit no new offenses are conditions precedent and until the defendant performs those acts there is no valid plea agreement (contract)? Therefore, there is no plea agreement until the very moment when the defendant arrives back in court for sentencing and has commited no new offenses?
Could the State defeat this by simply specifying/rewording the plea papers into two seperate contracts?
The first being the defendant hereby agrees that if the state recomends he be relased from jail before sentencing then the defendant pleas open to the court and waives his right to withdraw his plea unless a plea agreement is reached by the parties.
Then second agreement would be for the promise to appear at sentencing and not to commit any new offenses and the State will recommend X sentance. That way if the defendant does not show or commits new offenses then the defendant has no plea agreement and has waived his right to withdraw his plea.
If he does show and has committed no new offeses then the defendant can accept the States offer. If the judge rejects the plea offer then the defendant could withdraw his guilty plea because a plea agreement was reached by the state and defendant.
[This message was edited by Chris Parker on 12-02-06 at .]
Wes makes a good point. The bargain seems to be for the waiver of the right to withdraw an open guilty plea should he commit a new crime or fail to appear at sentencing. But it wasn't written that way, at least not that explicitly.
A defendant has no constitutional right to withdraw a guilty plea. The right arises from the article 26.13, which grants it for felony offenses if there is an agreed punishment recommendation. It certainly seems appropriate for a defendant to be able to negotiate away a statutory right in exchange for the possibility of a lowered punishment, pending good behavior.
How is this any different than the State making a deal with a witness to receive immunity from prosecution, pending his truthful testimony against a co-defendant? If the witness lies or fails to tell all the truth, the deal is off. At the time of the deal, we certainly don't know if the defendant is going to tell the truth.
But, still unanswered is, "Why let the defendant go free for several weeks if you know he is headed to prison for a long time?" I don't know why in this case, but I could hazard a guess that it was the only way to get him to plead.
Well, I certainly have to believe that Moore would have fared differently if his claim had been reviewed by the Sixth Circuit court rather than in Fort Worth. Ellis. They seem to understand the voluntariness which arises in negotiating a contract a bit differently.
I often find myself in the position of trying to extract restitution from thieves. We typically set a case for a plea with an agreement conditioned upon payment of the restitution. Routinely, the thief will arrive for his plea without the requisite funds. At this point, I will often offer to let the defendant plead "Open", ie without an agreed recommendation. The plea papers also say, however, that if the defendant pays restitution by the sentencing date, the prosecutor will recommend a given sentence at the sentencing hearing. The defendant waives his right to appeal, and we do the plea. And if he does not appear, I file a bond jumping case.
Posts: 71 | Location: Houston, Texas, USA | Registered: January 24, 2003
The CCA reversed the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment that the defendant converted his plea into an open plea by violating the law pending his return for sentencing. For an interesting review of plea bargaining and contract law, read the opinion.
A common sense opinion I can understand which contains practical advice that I can put into effect about how to handle these matters. Christmas has come early.
Posts: 62 | Location: Richmond, Texas, USA | Registered: May 07, 2003
Possibly the most interesting aspect is that this is a unanimous opinion. Obviously, the intermediate court was also wrong in its evaluation of whether the case involved legal issues important to the jurisprudence of the state.
I am having some difficulty seeing the distinction made in Delgado. Exactly how should the waiver agreement be worded to convert the conditional plea into a true advance waiver? Or is it impossible to accomplish that? "Following" a modified plea bargain and rejecting a plea bargain seem very similar to me.
