My inclination is that these documents should be provided in discovery, but the department is concerned about them being provided, so I thought I'd see how others are handling this issue. If you're not providing them, how do you justify that under 39.14?

What about the law enforcement privilege in CPRC? If they are really upset about it, it might help you make your case if their lawyer filed objections to the release of the documents in question. Did they even include those in their case file submitted to you? If so, does it fall under Michael Morton? Don't forget that the cops have all kinds of information that doesn't go in a case file. If defendant's want that they have to go beyond 39.14.

Morton says the defense attorney can't share the information with anyone outside the defense team, so production doesn't mean full public disclosure. If there is reason to question the defense attorney's compliance with Morton, perhaps they would agree to a protective order like those routinely used for HIPAA medical records?

A lot of law enforcement documentation is confidential with exceptions to the Public Information Act (open records, Government Code 552) but that stuff isn't privileged as required to justify withholding under 39.14(a). The true evidentiary privileges are in Article V of the Rules of Evidence, not the Government Code. In fact, 39.14(m) explicitly says that a Morton request trumps those confidentiality provisions. Confidential means less protected than privileged.

If you have work product that you need to redact or withhold, notify the defense and, if they care to make an issue of it, they can request the hearing under 39.14(c). The judge could review the disputed evidence in camera to decide whether it is discoverable. Watch out for the narrow definition of work product in Pope v. State, 207 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)

You can’t avoid production simply because the officers still have it and it isn’t in your file. If the evidence was requested under 39.14(a) then the request applies to both the state and to anyone under contract with the state. AG opinion KP-0041 concluded that the 3rd party company that provides the jail phones for Ft. Worth (and records the inmate calls) is "under contract with the state" for the purposes of Morton, even though actual contract is through the county commissioner's court and the day-to-day operation involves the SO rather than the DA. You’ll need to produce or find a justification to withhold if it was requested under 39.14(a).

That same AG opinion also said the prosecution DOES NOT have an affirmative duty to listen to all the phone calls and pick out Brady material to give to the defense. That said, a mandamus failed against a Corpus Christi judge who ordered the state to prove specific jail recordings rather than a wholesale data-dump, see 13-16-00221-CR IN RE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. MARK SKURKA

Law enforcement is "the State" for Brady purposes, as illustrated by this barely-pre-Morton case:
"Even if the prosecutor [is] not personally aware of the evidence, the State is not relieved of its duty to disclose because 'the State' includes, in addition to the prosecutor, other lawyers and employees in his office and members of law enforcement connected to the investigation and prosecution of the case." Ex parte Miles, 359 S.W.3D 647, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

Why would Morton be more restrictive than Brady when it comes to the question of who is the state or a person under contract with the state?

39.14(a) requires an explicit request from the defense, includes items and information in possession of anyone under contract with the state, but the requested items or information may be withheld if it is work product or otherwise privileged.

39.14(h) does not require a request, but only applies to the state, not those under contract with the state. It imposes an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory, mitigating, and impeachment information to the defense, even if the information is work product, privileged, immaterial, etc. There is no justification under 39.14 for withholding this category of information. (Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the state shall disclose ... )

Failure to abide by (h) is also a problem with the Bar:
"Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 3.09(d) imposes a duty to disclose any information that tends to negate the guilt of the accused without regard to whether the information is material under the standard imposed by Brady v. Maryland and subsequent cases." Schultz v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 55649 (Tex. Dec. 17, 2015)

Do you think it requires more than, "May I have the discovery on this case?"

Is an oral request for discovery sufficient? Is an email?

Should the email state, "may I have the discovery pursuant to 39.14(a) and (b) please?"

and is that enough to trigger the requirements under (b)?