Joe admitted, under oath, assault on family member at protective order hearing. Does Crawford preclude introduction of that statement at his later trial for same assault when he declines to testify? The statement is testimonial and out-of-court.
Admission of a defendant's statement can't be a Confrontation Clause violation. See Cantu v. State, 339 S.W.3d 688, 691 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2011, no pet.); United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2006).
Posts: 143 | Location: Fort Worth | Registered: August 08, 2001
Thank you for responding to my Crawford question. Am I correct that your response is based on the fact that Crawford proscribes only the admission of testimonial hearsay, and Protective order hearing Respondent admission is not hearsay when entered at assault trial of Respondent/Defendant/Party-Opponent? If so, State may enter Defendant's prior testimonial admission as impeachment--BUT ONLY IF HE TESTIFIES?
No -- its admission is not dependent on whether he testifies. As the statement of a party-opponent, it is (a) nonhearsay; (b) admissible as substantive evidence; and (c) not a confrontation clause violation (because it isn't hearsay).
Just think of it as the same as a police-induced confession by the defendant. That statement would be indisputably testimonial. And it is a statement that is admissible for all purposes against the defendant. And it won't violate Crawford.
Posts: 143 | Location: Fort Worth | Registered: August 08, 2001
The factors indicate that the protective order hearing admission is admissible against Defendant at trial. I was confused by the inadmissibility at trial of Defendant's suppression hearing statements (also non-hearsay and testimonial). The difference must be that 28.01 hearings are pre-trial and protective order hearings are not. Thanks again for the help.
Testimony at a suppression hearing is inadmissible later for an entirely different reason (having nothing to do with confrontation).
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) established that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not be thereafter admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.