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| Judge, does whoever dares to answer have to claim to be a top prosecutor capable of giving sage advice? I do not know whether I will qualify under those terms or not, but I will try to help. You seem to be describing Leonard David May's case to a T. If so, then in my opinion there is yet another problem-- the court of appeals failed to apply the applicable law, namely the last sentence of art. 42.12, sec. 5 (b) (amended effective January 1, 1996, I believe by Acts 1995, ch. 595). But, the State failed to challenge that ruling and I guess you will be following the "law" of that case, though you might just try imposing a proper punishment once again.
Whether we are talking about Mays or some similar case, even though the specified term of the supervision expired as a result the foiled initial attempt of the court to hear and determine the State's motion, I see no basis for the defendant to argue the court has lost jurisdiction to grant relief to the State. Certainly sec. 5 (c) does not apply to require dismissal and discharge merely because the original supervision period expired. Prior, 795 S.W.2d at 184. Rather, "all proceedings" should now "continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred". The appeal may effectively have postponed the point in time when those proceedings can take place, but I do not see how it deprived the court of authority to act. Sec. 5 (b) specifies no timetable for the events it details.
Furthermore, since the defendant could not appeal the court's determination to adjudicate guilt, that decision stands. Surely, the court is still entitled to take action based on that decision. In my opinion that decision terminated the original term of supervision (i.e., it never "expired"). The court has proceeded to adjudication of guilt within the original period. That is all that is important. If the defendant must be placed on a new term of community supervision so be it, but that is the action that seems indicated to me. |
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| Judge, technically any judgment placing the defendant on probation is stayed by the filing of the notice of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(e). Thus, our position has been that a trial judge cannot make a defendant report, etc. via a judgment of probation while the defendant is appealing, nor does the defendant get credit on his probation term during the pendency of the appeal. Many of our judges do require defendants in this position to post an appeal bond, and require periodic reports (and other acts) as conditions of the bond. I am unsure whether defendant's get "credit" if the conditions they meet under the bond also satisfy conditions of their probation. (At least one of our defense lawyers really tries to play this quirky area). In our view, the defendant does not start probation until the appeal is over, and we cannot revoke the defendant's probation for acts committed during the pendency of the appeal. The term has not expired because it did not start until you received the appellate court mandate.
In short, if an appellate court reversed your judgment and ordered a new punishment hearing, I think you can give him up to 5 years probation, regardless of the passage of time during the pendency of the appeal.
I don't claim to be sage or a top prosecutor, and would love to hear what others think. |
| Posts: 2138 | Location: McKinney, Texas, USA | Registered: February 15, 2001 |  
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| "Madness" might well describe how the courts have treated 25.2. Though an entirely logical argument, to my knowledge subsection (e) has never been given the interpretation John R. suggests by a real judge. At least with respect to regular probation, I have interpreted the appeal as suspending the revocation order. Thus, instead of being required to commence service of a sentence of imprisonment, the probationer must continue to perform under the original order (as the court has just found he was unable to do). Margiotta, 10 S.W.3d 416, 418. I believe my opinion is shared by Professors Dix and Dawson, see 43A Texas Practice, Criminal Practice and Procedure, sec. 40.126 fn. 4. However, they do state that if the date specified in the order for termination arrives during the pendency of the appeal, the requirement of compliance with the conditions in the original order then ends. But, the jurisdiction of the court under sec. 5 to conduct further proceedings does not expire just because the original order does and the court can upon remand re-assess the punishment, etc. (though perhaps subject to former sec. 15(a) as worded prior to the 1997 amendment). Since the necessity for those further proceedings is not known until the mandate of the appellate court is received, it would be preposterous to say the mere passage of time constitutes or creates a bar to doing what the statute (and the order of the court of appeals) says should be done. |
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