I just got through reading Brown v. State, No. 0059-03 in the January/Feburary TDCAA Report. There the CCA held that the jury charge language which read that the jury could infer the defendant's intent by his acts done and the words spoken was an improper comment on the weight of the evidence.

If the jury charge reads, "you may infer the defendant's intent or lack thereof by acts done or words spoken" would it be okay.

I have a problem when we ask jurors to follow the law and yet consistently tear from them the approriate instructions from the charge. I know that you can argue it in closing, but I find that my jurors do follow the charge and if it is not contained therein as an instruction, they are weary of my argument that they can consider it.

What do you think?

No responses made to this old post - can someone chime in asap on (1) language in the jury charge similar to the original post and (2) bringing it up in open/close? Defense argument in voir dire was "defendant had to know it (knife) was illegal (prohibited)" which I know is wrong, but how do I properly instruct the jury on knowledge/intent (kid really on his way to a fight but defense arguing dad's truck, dad's work knife, poor kid).

I don't know that the proposed change to the jury instruction really solves the problem.

Just because the judge can't put that in the charge does not mean that you cannot talk about it in voir dire or closing arguments.

I agree with JohnR. The CCA was merely indicating that the judge should not be planting a particular permissible inference in the written jury instructions, thereby suggesting it has any more weight or power than any other inference that might be drawn. That does nothing to limit a prosecutor's ability to explore the relevance and application of those inferences during voir dire, opening statements and final arguments.

A careful reading of Brown supports JohnR and JB's absolutely proper analysis. The subsequent case of Walters, also from the CCA, is worth a read too.

JAS