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| Never seen it before, but the language of 49.04(d) is against you since it limits itself to uses under that section. Other than that, the general rule in felony cases is that you are not finally convicted until your probation is revoked and you're sent to the pen. See, e.g., Ex parte Langley, 833 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Langley applied the habitual enhancement statute that also used the term "finally convicted." The transportation code doesn't otherwise define "finally convicted." So, I would think no, you can't forfeit the vehicle unless he's been revoked on the priors. |
| Posts: 2138 | Location: McKinney, Texas, USA | Registered: February 15, 2001 |
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| The key here is that Section 704 uses the term "finally convicted," unlike Article 42.12 Sections 4 and 15, construed in Jordan. While the Jordan Court said that the term "conviction" contains a finality requirement even without the modifier "finally," when the terms are combined the first place an appellate court would probably look is section 12.42 and the cases construing it, which hold that "finally" means after revocation of probation. Part of the confusion stems from the use of "final" to mean, in different circumstances, that the appellate court has issued a mandate or the time to appeal has expired and that a suspended sentence has been imposed.
The counter-argument to my construction is that a requirement that the probations be revoked would cause an absurd result since we can send your defendant to prison for 10 years, but he is still allowed to own the car. Once you show an absurd result you can tap into any favorable legislative history and other policy arguments. The fact that "final" is ambiguous to the Court helps.
[This message was edited by John Rolater on 04-25-02 at .] |
| Posts: 2138 | Location: McKinney, Texas, USA | Registered: February 15, 2001 |
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| The legislative history of this statute or the view of its sponsor might be interesting. Since most Class B and many Class A and first-time felony offenses involve suspended sentences which are not revoked (possibly one reason for the wording in 49.09(d)), if 704.001(a)(2) requires the degree of finality demanded by 12.42, then it would likely be only the six or seventh or eighth time drunk driver and not the fourth-timer who might be subject to losing his car. It doesn't seem to offer much of any deterrent effect. Plus you have to get the restraining order and notify the DMV of it in order to keep the vehicle available for forfeiture at the end of the criminal proceeding. I went through this process one time, but unless its a really nice car I'll never try it again. And most of those drunk drivers don't have nice cars. |
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| I am told that at least in Sweden part of the penalty for a second-time offense is loss of driving privilege for the rest of your life and forfeiture of the vehicle. Certainly would seem to make it more difficult to again drink and drive if you don't have a car and can't find anyone willing to lend you theirs (for fear of losing it). At some point this logic takes hold- it's not theft its saving something, maybe even a life. The only question is how many cars do you get to drive drunk in before you really lose the opportunity? In Texas the answer is and will remain as many as you can afford. |
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| I tried last session to get Rep. Menendez to submit a bill to repeal 704 and put all DWI felonies under Chapt. 59 Forfeiture proceedings where they belong. Absolutely no luck at all! |
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