To John Bradley (or whoever else has an opinion): In your article "Stack It, Stack It Good" you state "if a defendant is on parole at the time he commits and is convicted of a new offense, a judge may stack the sentences." No doubt this conclusion is supported by such cases as Carpenter, 828 S.W.2d at 442. But it occurs to me that possibly Kuester, 21 S.W.3d 264, 272 changes this result when it holds revocation of parole does not allow a "re-stacking" of the sentences. By previously granting parole on the first sentence, has not the Board designated the date on which the prior sentence "ceased to operate" for purposes of 42.08(a)-- as that date is determined under the Kuester analysis? One other thought though. Is not this holding in Kuester dependent on the theory set forth in footnote 35, which was apparently discarded (though not expressly mentioned) in Hale, 117 S.W.3d at 872, fn. 26? Is there authority (that has been decided after June 21, 2000)for the ability of the court to stack a sentence upon another sentence for which the Defendant has already been paroled?

Ps. I have tried really hard to put this in understandable English, but if I have failed, be sure to let me know.