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| Let me attempt to understand the basis for such a ruling. Rule 401-2 says the evidence is relevant and admissible. 724.061 says the evidence is admissible. But 724.015, obviously designed only to protect a suspect from the rigors of 724.031 et seq., is a mandatory statute. Thus, although the officer made a request, which was refused, we pretend like no request was made because the cart somehow was being pulled by an imperfect horse. Thus the response to the request is now considered to have been illegally obtained and subject to the statutory exclusionary rule because it was an illegal request? 724.015 may provide a basis to say the breath test result is inadmissible, or that the DL cannot be suspended, but to say it prevents admission of a refusal to submit a sample makes not quite as much sense as Judge Johnson's dissent in Beeman. i.e., somewhat less than zero. I guess its all in the packaging, some defense attorneys would easily rival the purveyors of snake oil. |
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| I imagine the Defendant would testify that he would have agreed to provide the breath sample if he had only been told of the correct length of suspension. But, the judge, as finder of fact, should have the discretion to believe or not believe that statement.
A couple of sessions ago, we tried to get the legislature to change the warnings to say something far more general, like, "Really bad things can happen if you refuse to provide a breath sample." That way, the defendant frankly has a better understanding, and we don't get caught up in minute mistakes. It didn't pass.
How about: " I really don't care if you give me a breath sample or not, because you look really drunk. And if you refuse, I can just charge you with another crime. What do you want to do?" |
| Posts: 7860 | Location: Georgetown, Texas | Registered: January 25, 2001 |
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| Since when does the refusal to provide a sample have to be voluntary? And how does the failure to correctly state the suspension provisions have anything to do with admissibility for an entirely different purpose, i.e. inferring defendant's sample would have shown intoxication or that he at least had a reason to think it might? Presumably if the greater penalty had been explained, the defendant might have chosen to give a sample? Give me a break. A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. |
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| Maybe the issue is more confusing that I gave the judge credit for. I note that in Griffith, 55 S.W.3d at 601 fn.5, Erdman is cited for the following proposition: "police must warn D.W.I. suspects correctly about the statutory consequences of refusal before introducing that refusal as evidence of intoxication". While Erdman actually dealt with admissibility of the results of a test, the fact that it is erroneously said to hold as stated is some evidence that the matter can be easily confused (by judges). |
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| The holding of the 1st Court of Appeals, that a failure to comply perfectly with the warning statute does not prohibit use of the breath test results, would seem applicable to a refusal as well. The evidence of the refusal was not obtained as a result of the bad DIC-24. There was no causal connection. |
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| OK, I admit my mistake. The judge was faithful to the law. Who says you have to study logic in order to learn law. Woehst |
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