Let's say a child sex abuse Defendant takes a run for the border the day before trial. Some years later, he finally gets apprehended and he goes to trial.
Several family members and friends testify on his behalf at trial, saying he didn't mess w/ their kids, he's not the type to do this kind of thing, blah, blah, blah.
Let's say that the State has tons of records and credible information indicating that said witnesses assisted the Defendant during his flight, to the point that they might could even be charged w/ hindering (but for some significant venue issues).

What do y'all think about the permissibility of cross examining those witnesses about the fact that they helped him to stay free, in violation of state and federal law. Granted, it's a specific instance of conduct, so 608 should ordinarily keep it out, but it seems to me that it goes directly to the bias of that witness under Rule 613-- you're willing to break the law to help this guy, is it really much of a stretch to believe you'd be willing to lie to a jury to help him? Thus, it ought to be an exception to 608, shouldn't it?
Opinions anyone?

I think your situation is close enough to the exception noted in Moreno, 22 S.W.3d at 485-6, where the court said: "Care must be taken in using evidence of unadjudicated crimes for impeachment. Such evidence is not admissible to show bad character for truthfulness. Rule of Evidence 609 permits only evidence of convictions, and Rule 608(b) does not allow
specific instances of a witness's conduct to be proved or inquired into on the issue of credibility. But evidence that involves unadjudicated crimes could be admissible to show a witness's bias or interest in the particular case."

You might look at Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ("[Rule 61[3](b) ] deals with a specific reason why a witness might slant or shade the truth in this one instance while [Rule 608(b) deals] with the witness who, it is asserted, does not tell the truth as a general proposition. The rules do not deal with the same type of impeachment and should be considered as distinct and independent.") quoting letter brief from Cathleen C. Herasimchuck.