In the jurisdiction where I work I have come across several unsafe speed tickets. My question involves scenerios where the officer is called out to a scene where a car has hydroplaned or otherwise run off the road and has not struck another person or vehicle. Under TC 545.351(a) An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing. My interpretation is 545.352 is used to establish objective criteria to interpret 545.351.

My question is whether a vehicle traveling under the posted speed limit, and which did not strike another person or vehicle as stated in 545.351(b)(2) should be charged with violating 545.351 Maximum Speed Requirement.

If yes, how would one rectify this wcharge with 545.352(b) Unless a special hazard exists that requires a slower speed for compliance with Section 545.351(b), the following speeds are lawful:...?

Additionally, assuming the officer has no other information given by the driver or any witness, how would one be able to allege a speed at which the defendant is to have driven as required by TC 543.010?

Your question is something I've wondered about too. There is very little case law on the topic. About the only time courts review these things is when the car had contraband in it.

However, the way I read the statute, 545.351(b)(1) is the offense of speeding, 545.351(b)(2) is failure to control speed and 545.351(c)is the offense of unsafe speed. I have used 545.351(c)(5)in "hydrplaning" cases.

As far as Sec. 543.010 is concerned I've had some success arguing that it refers to a speeding charge not failure to control speed or unsafe speed.

That said these are difficult cases simply because there is usually very little evidence.

545.351(c) states "An operator shall, consistent with Subsections (a) and (b), drive at an appropriate speed if:...".

545.351(b) states "shall control the speed of the vehicle as necessary to avoid colliding with another person or vehicle...".

Since the language of the statute says consistent with (a) and (b), I do not see how (c) would work in situations where a driver did not hit someone else.

Ephraim v. State, 237 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2007)is a case whereby a defendant was convicted of unsafe speed in a single car accident. The court's take was a little different than mine but the point is the driver in a single car accident can be guilty of the offense of unsafe speed. In Ephraim the driver was charged under (a).

I did notice this was one of very few cases to use the term "unsafe sepeed." In Ephraim it seems the the defense plead to a so called "unsafe speed" ticket then argued the ticket was a lesser included offense of intoxication assault for double jeopardy purposes. The defense then appealed the conviction of the intoxicaton assault to the Texarkana court which applied the Blockberger rule to determine �545.351(a)had a unique element from intoxication assault in that with intoxication asault there is no neccessity to show a speed excessive to what was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. My reading of the case is that it does not clarify what �545.351 really is, but rather that it has an element different from intoxication assault.

[This message was edited by MMB on 10-03-08 at .]

There seems to be an old line of thought that the offense of speeding using only a definition simular to 545.351(a) would be unconstitutional in that it would be void as operation of law for vagueness. The statutes have been moved around, but TC 545.351(a)seems largely unchanged from the older definitions of speeding. It seems that the courts began reading the the prima facia speed limit statute together with the defintion of speeding to provide objective criteria for the determination of the speeding offense. In the somewhat arcane case of Rowland v. State, 311 S.W. 2d 831, Justice Davidson considers this with his dissent, and seems to not approve of the conjuctive reading of the speeding definition and the prima facia speed statute acting as substantive law to denounce an offense. I have not yet come across a case that answers conclusively wheter a bald reading of 545.351(a), without using any other statute as objective criteria, is unconstitutionally void for vagueness.

While an officer certainly can write an unsafe speed ticket for a one car accident, I tend to see it as a bit overmuch... especially in the case where the are no injuries or damage beyond the defendant's car.
Our local DPS troopers write them and claim it is DPS policy to always write a ticket, but I have little problem with dismissing the charges. Now when there are injuries or significant property damage, we have a different situation and I will prosecute readily.
While it always can be argued that any accident could be avoided if you are driving slow enough, unsafe speed is a situation where common sense is paramount.

I know that they can write tickets for it, as they do frequently. I am not sure that it is legal under 545.351(a), and I don't know how they come up with an alleged speed as required by 543.010. How does one deal with 545.352 that states a speed under the limit is legal "[u]nless a special hazard exists that requires a slower speed for compliance with Section 545.351(b)"?

Well, It's pretty reasonable to assume that if you lose control of the car and have a wreck, the speed is neither reasonable or prudent under the circumstances then existing. 543.010 refers to speeding and unsafe speed is a different offense.
As far as any special hazards go you do have to name them, such as icy road, loose gravel, wet road, etc.

You might check out Ephraim v. State, 237 S.W.3d 438. It's an intox assault case, but the court discusses 545.351 because the appellant argued that he should have been charged with the lesser offense. I have always understood that offense to mean that regardless of the posted speed on a road, if a driver operates the vehicle at a speed that is unsafe due to external conditions--road construction, ice, rain, fog, etc.--then it is an offense.

Janette A

I agree with you, Janette as long as the condition was something the driver could observe. I had an engineer come in once with schematics of Hwy 377 coming south in to Granbury. It turns out that one mile of the road was an experimental asphalt / surface that during testing had a tendency to have ice patterns difficult to detect by the average driver. The man had charts and graphs and certified records all to prove that there was no way he could have known that there was a slick spot that caused his truck to slide then roll.

I was fairly convinced that no driver would have anticipated a condition requiring a slower speed under those circumstances. (The Engineer wasn't aware of these conditions until after he studied what happened.) After reviewing it with the trooper, we dismissed the case.

The question about 545.352 has not been addressed. "Unless a special hazard exists that requires a slower speed for compliance with Section 545.351(b), the following speeds are lawful..."

There is no mention of 541.351 (c) as an exception to the lawfulness of speed under the prima facie speed limits, and (b) would appear to require a collision with a another person of vehicle.

Based on 545.352 it would not appear proper to prosecute a violation of 545.351 Maximum Speed Requirement for a speed under the posted limit except for under 545.351(b).