TC grants MFNT based upon juror misconduct. The juror had posted some comments about his jury service in a chat forum.

The D testified at he punishment hearing and made detailed admissions about his guilt in the agg robbery. He also testified extensively about his personal and family life. He said he committed the crime because a woman he had lived with told him she would never return unless he had some money. He also claims she came uo with the robbery idea and assisted by bringing him the object he used to strike the victim and picking him up after he ditched his own car.

I am finding very few cases showing how introduction of former testimony and the rule of optional completeness interact. I would appreciate any help.....

I think the only argument against you is that his testimony in the punishment hearing was for a limited purpose. Ramirez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 152, 155-56 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. ref'd) (no bar to using defendant's probation revocation testimony in criminal trial).

The defendant voluntarily took the stand in the punishment phase of the trial. All of his testimony was befor ethe jury. Ramirez refres to Nelson v State, 765 SW2d 401, for the blurb, "a defendant's own statement may be admissible at one phase of a proceeding , but not be admissible at the guilt/innocence phase."

In Nelson, the D took the stand in guilt. The State sought to impeach him with priors. At a hearing out side the jury's hearing, the D testified and the Court found the priors too remote. At punishment, the State, over defense objection, introduced the D testimony from the voir dire hearing about the priors. The CCA reversed, saying that the D had testified for the limited purpose of showing the remoteness of the priors.

So far as I can see, here was no limitation on the D former punishment testimony in my case.

You could be right. Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (citing cases which had held that admissions of guilt at punishment could be used in retrial); Cagle v. State, 23 S.W.3d 590, 592 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000)(defendant has no right to testify at punishment for a limited purpose).

That seems inconsistent with Brumfield v. State
445 S.W.2d 732, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (suggesting that the reason a defendant does not forfeit his right not to testify at punishment when he testifies at guilt innocence is because his guilt phase testimony is for a limited purpose as compared to punishment).

Chavez, 508 SW2d 374, CCA-1974, appears to control. In that case, D pled guilty to the jury and testified at punishment with what amounted to a detailed confession to the rape of a 7 1/2 year-old girl. The child turned up missing from her house. A tracking dog led officers down an alleyway to a field where a deputy found the D on top of the child and kicked him off of her. (see: Chavez,408 SW2d 714, the facts are hair-raising)

The jury sentenced the D to death. On habeas. the case was reversed. At the next trial D "pled not guilty." At the guilt phase of the new trial, the State introduced the D former testimony from the unitary trial that followed his plea of guilt. On appeal the CCA affirmed the D 60 year sentence.

In Nelson, Judge Teague joined by Judge miller concurred in the result but criticized the rationale in Chavez, finding it contrary to the "spirit" if not the letter of Brumfield. In Brumfield, the D testified at guilt and the State recalled him in punishment over the D objection! Judge Teague (incorrectly, in my view) opined that the procdure in Chavez was tantamount to compelling the defendant to testify against himself, albeit through the mouth of the reporter.