Does anyone know the name of the recent CCA case wherein the Court held that anonymous calls about bad driving coupled with an officer's observations justify reasonable suspiscion for a DWI stop?

I know that may be a bit vague, but that's why I'm trying to find the case. I can't remember whether the officer had to independently observe bad driving.

Thanks for your help.

I can tell you up front that the officer does not have to see the bad driving. I don't know how recent you want the case to be but here are some cites for you:

Brother v. State, 166 SW3d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
Gansky v. State, 180 SW3d 240 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2005 pet ref'd)
State v. Fudge, 42 SW3d 226 (Tex. App - Austin 2001 reh overruled)

Ahh the wonders of Google Desktop

State v Nelson
3rd Court of Appeals - Austin
June 29, 2007 - 03-06-00352-CR

Search and seizure. Probable cause to stop D�s vehicle but not to arrest.
Prior to D�s scheduled DWI trial, the trial court granted D�s motion to suppress, concluding that both the initial traffic stop and the subsequent arrest of D were unlawful. The State appealed. Held: Affirmed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the State that the initial stop was unlawful but agreed with the trial court�s conclusion that there was not probable cause for the arrest. The evidence at the suppression hearing showed that X was driving her car when she noticed the vehicle ahead driving in what she considered to be an erratic fashion, including excessive weaving and almost entering the wrong side of a divided road in a construction area. X called a police dispatcher to report the erratic driving and Y responded to the dispatch. Officer Y followed the suspect car being driven by D and the videotape camera in Y�s patrol car recorded D�s driving. The videotape reflected that Y followed the suspect vehicle for one minute before stopping it. During this time, the vehicle drifted toward the broken line dividing the north-bound lane three times, touching the line with its left tires. The vehicle also drifted to the right three times, once touching and twice crossing the solid line, called the fog line, separating the outer lane of traffic from the improved shoulder. The two times the fog line was crossed, the suspect vehicle�s right tires were never more than a few inches over the line and they remained there for no more than one or two seconds. Y acknowledged that there was no other traffic and that he did not see the suspect vehicle commit an unsafe act. Y testified that he stopped D�s vehicle for failing to maintain a single lane and for driving on the improved shoulder. A warrantless stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure analogous to a temporary detention and it must be justified by reasonable suspicion. The factual basis for stopping a vehicle need not arise from the officer�s personal observation but may be supplied by information from another. A stop based on facts supplied by a citizen-eyewitness, when adequately corroborated by an officer, is sufficient to provide probable cause or reasonable suspicion. �Corroboration� does not mean that the officer must personally observe the conduct that causes him to suspect that a crime, is, or has been, or is about to be committed. Here, without regard to whether D committed a traffic violation in Y�s presence, a question that the Court did not decide, D�s weaving from side to side in a single lane of traffic gave enough additional corroboration to X�s report to support the trial court�s ruling in light of the deference owed to decisions made by a trial court. After stopping D, Officer Y had D step from her vehicle. Y told D that another driver had reported that she was driving all over the road. Y acknowledged this, explaining that she had been looking for a snuff can. Y noticed the snuff can in open view in a pocket in the driver�s side door panel. Y did not smell any alcohol on D�s breath and he found no nystagmus, horizontal or vertical, during his performance of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. During the period of time that Y talked with D and administered the first of the field sobriety tests, D appeared to stand in one place without any swaying of her body. Y stated that D�s pupils were constricted, which could be a sign that D was under the influence of some type of drug, but Y acknowledged that the headlights of his patrol unit were bright and could have caused D�s eyes to constrict. Y testified that D failed two field sobriety tests, the walk and turn test and the one leg stand test, but the videotape from the squad car conflicted with some of Y�s statements about the test. The trial court also found and Y acknowledged in his testimony that the field tests were not performed in strict accordance with the prescribed standardized procedures. For example, Y admitted that the field sobriety tests should have been conducted on a flat and dry area. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court�s ruling granting D�s suppression motion and deferring to the trial court�s findings of fact, the State did not meet its burden of proving that Y had probable cause to arrest D for DWI.

Whether or not information supplied by a third party is reasonable depends upon the content and reliability of the information presented to the officer. Hime v. State, 998 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. App.�Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref�d). �When police receive information from a private citizen whose only contact with the police is a result of having witnessed a criminal act committed by another, the credibility and reliability of the information is inherent.� Cornejo v. State, 917 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. App.�Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref�d).

Pipkin v. State, 114 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.�Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)

Oops, after I gave you that I saw you wanted CCA--the first two I gave you are "pet ref'd," which should be strong for you.

From Winborn v. State
Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2007 WL 1711791
Tex.App.-Austin,2007.
June 13, 2007 (Approx. 3 pages)

quote:

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An officer may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than on his or her direct observation, so long as the officer confirms enough facts so that he or she may reasonably conclude that the information provided is reliable and a detention is justified. See White, 496 U.S. at 330-31. This does not mean that the officer must personally observe the conduct that causes him to reasonably suspect that a crime is being, has been, or is about to be committed. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 259 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)). Rather, it means that the police officer, in light of the circumstances, confirms enough facts to reasonably conclude that the information given to him is reliable and a temporary detention is thus justified. Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 259. As discussed above, Hoffman's tip contained indicia of reliability because he placed himself in a position to be easily identified and held responsible for the information provided. Additionally, several minutes after dispatch contacted Corporal Anderson relaying Hoffman's tip, Anderson identified a vehicle in the same location and with the same license plate number described by Hoffman. When Corporal Anderson confirmed that Winborn's vehicle was located where Hoffman indicated and matched the description given, she was justified in initiating an investigative stop. See Hime v. State, 998 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd).


The facts of this case are nearly identical to the facts presented in Hime. See id. In that case, an informant called the police to report her observation of an individual's reckless driving. See id. at 895. The informant described the suspect's vehicle, erratic driving, and location, and gave her name to dispatch. Id. After the police identified the vehicle matching Skelton's description in the location described by Skelton, they stopped the vehicle and arrested the driver for driving while intoxicated. Id. Although Skelton did not contact the police in a face-to-face manner, �[b]ecause Skelton identified herself by name to the police dispatch operator, she was not an anonymous informant.� Id. As a result, the court held that Skelton's tip to the police, plus corroboration by the police of the information relayed by Skelton, justified the investigatory stop. See id. at 896.


*4 Winborn contends that her case is similar to Davis v. State, 989 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. ref'd), in which this Court held that an anonymous tip that served as the sole basis for a detention was not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion. In that case, an officer received a report of reckless driving from dispatch, including the vehicle's description and location, and a statement that three white males inside the vehicle were �possibly smoking marijuana.� Id. The informant did not leave a name or address with the dispatcher, and no one stopped at the scene claiming to be the informant. Id.


We conclude that the facts of this case are distinguishable from the situation in Davis and are, instead, more closely analogous to the facts presented in Hime. While the informant in Davis did not volunteer identifying information and was never identified, the informant in this case identified himself and put himself in a position to be held responsible for the information provided. Corporal Anderson testified at the suppression hearing that Hoffman left his name and address with dispatch �in case [the police] needed to make contact with him.� As a result, Hoffman was not an anonymous informer as in Davis. See Hime, 998 S.W.2d at 895. His phoned-in tip contained indicia of reliability similar to those bolstering reliability of a tip delivered by an informant who flags down the police and delivers the information in person. These indicia of reliability, when combined with Corporal Anderson's observation of Winborn's vehicle consistent with Hoffman's description, and viewed in the totality of the circumstances, provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative stop of Winborn's vehicle. See id. at 896.

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I believe the one you are asking about is Curtis v. State.