A defendant who was given probation after a jury trial is now appealing his case. (Talk about hitting a man while he's down...first your jury recommends probation, then you still have to write a brief!) The judge wants to assess conditions of the appeal bond that are similar to the conditions of probation that he has already assessed. Is there any special language that needs to be included in the conditions of bond to make them enforceable? If the defendant doesn't comply, we want to be able to get his bond revoked.

Any ideas?

Look at the CCA's decision in XP Anderer, 61 SW3d 393 (CCA 2001) b/c it made significant changes (for the better) re what constitutes a reasonable appeal bond condition. Here's a synopsis from TDCAA's appellate manual:

If appeal bond conditions are set, they must be reasonable. Art. 44.04(c). This sole statutory requirement for appeal bonds differs dramatically from the statutory standards imposed on pretrial bond conditions which include reasonableness, securing a defendant�s attendance at trial, and victim-safety. Compare art. 44.04(c) with Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.15 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (Rules for Fixing Amount of Bail). The difference between the statutory requirements for pretrial bail and appellate bonds are critical, as is the difference between the interests protected. In spite of these differences, myriad appeal bond decisions have relied upon opinions reviewing pretrial bond matters as seen in Estrada v. State, 594 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) and its progeny. However, in Ex parte Anderer, the Court of Criminal Appeals dubbed this reliance mistaken. Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d at 403, overruling Estrada, 594 S.W.2d 445. Ex parte Anderer announced the need to apply new, broader criteria when reviewing the propriety of appeal bond conditions. Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d at 405.
The Anderer opinion shifted appellate focus in appeal bond matters after rethinking what interests are called into play when a convicted defendant is released on an appeal bond. From the defense standpoint, protecting a defendant from an erroneous judgment is the only interest furthered by a defendant�s right to remain free during appeal. Id. at 406. Hence, the issue is not whether the class of defendants afforded appeal bonds should be denied the right to remain free during the pendency of their appeal but, instead, while they are free on bond, what conditions associated with that freedom are reasonable? Id. Balanced against the defendant�s interests are society�s significant concern for enforcing penal laws and ensuring safety through deterrence, rehabilitation, and preventing recidivism. Id.
Based upon the balancing of these factors, Anderer sought to kindle a different approach to deciding what constitutes a reasonable condition for an appellate bond. Convicted of criminally negligent homicide, Anderer contested a bond condition preventing him from driving any vehicle during the pendency of his appeal. Id. at 398. Finding this condition reasonable in light of the crime committed, the Court opined that conditions imposed for the purpose of protecting public safety are reasonable in the bail-pending-appeal scenario. Id. The decision in Ex parte Anderer calls for a broader interpretation of the reasonableness of appeal bond conditions, and factors that promote law enforcement and safety issues should be contemplated in juxtaposition to the defendant�s right to remain free. Id. at 406. The reasonableness of an appeal bond condition should not hinge on its ability to secure a defendant�s presence in court. Id.
Ex parte Anderer expressly disavowed several significant appeal bond cases besides Estrada. Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d at 405 n.33 & 35; see, e.g., Dallas v. State, 983 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (voiding a bond condition prohibiting the defendant from working in any animal-related business while appealing his cruelty to animals conviction since that condition did not relate to the purpose of assuring the defendant�s continued appearance); Valenciano v. State, 720 S.W.2d 523, 524-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (condition to stay away from his family residence while appealing his indecency conviction unreasonable because it had no bearing on assuring the defendant�s return to court should the appeal be affirmed); Speth v. State, 939 S.W.2d 769, 770-71 (Tex. App.�Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (bond requirement to avoid chiropractic work was not related to assuring court appearance); Ex parte Sotelo, 878 S.W.2d 179, 180-81 (Tex. App.�Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref�d) (the bond reasonably required routine urinalyses in this non-drug-related appeal because this condition helped to assure the defendant�s appearance upon affirmance; other Estrada-like conditions held reasonable); Easton v. Rains, 866 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. App.�Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.) (condition requiring payment of court costs voided since unrelated to securing the defendant�s presence; other Estrada-like conditions upheld); Rodriguez v. State, 744 S.W.2d 361, 362-64 (Tex. App.�Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.) (prohibition against contact with victim reasonable because its purpose was to thwart future violence which would increase the likelihood that the defendant would appear when ordered). The Court�s disapproval of these cases ends the need to consider whether a condition will assist in securing a defendant�s return to court after an unsuccessful appeal; furthermore, Ex parte Anderer constitutes a marked shift to broader law enforcement and security-related concerns when testing the reasonableness of appeal bond conditions.

Good luck!