Question #1:
It appears since the decisions in Ex Parte Porter, 827 SW2d 324, and McClain v. State, 687 SW2d 350, that the State, even if it has only charged "....unlawfully appropriate property, to wit: a widget of the value of $X or more, but less than $X, without the effective consent of the owner, Bob Doe" (in other words, 31.03(a)(b)(1)) the State can still get a charge on 31.03(a)(b)(2) "receiving stolen property" as it used to be called (the property is stolen and the actor appropriates the property knowing it was stolen by another)

It appears that the Ct. of Crim. App. said that when the theft statute was revamped to include all the old distinctions into one grand "theft" statute, that the State no longer has to plead specifically between (a)(b)(1) and (a)(b)(2), as the Court said it had decided wrongly in Casey v. State, 633 SW2d 885 (which McClain expressly overruled.) The Court, I think, is saying those are evidentiary distinctions/proof distinctions only.

Am I reading this correctly?

Question #2: Anyone know of any good cases illustrating that if a person offers to sell an item he knew was previously stolen by another (and he wasn't involved in the initial theft), that he is just as guilty of theft? Basically, some good "fencing" cases where the offeror may not have actually ever had the property in his hands nor even saw it, but he was the "go-between?" Is he guilty as a party, or just plain guilty of the old "receiving" stolen property even if he never laid eyes on the property? If he never sees or posesses it, has he "appropriated" it for the purposes of the statute? (OK, I snuck....yes, I said snuck....a few more questions in there.)

Thanks for reading, and more thanks for replying