Member
| "It is our studied decision that the discretion the trial judge has to revoke the suspension of commitment for contempt and probation ordered terminates when the period of probation has expired without a motion to revoke having been filed during the period of probation, and that the contemnor cannot afterwards be committed under the prior order of contempt. Our holding of the termination of the judge's discretion under such circumstances is the same holding applicable to revocation of probation in criminal cases under similar circumstances. See, e.g., McBee v. State, 166 Tex.Crim. 562, 316 S.W.2d 748, 749 (1958)."
Ex parte Spikes, 909 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex.App.-Amarillo Oct 10, 1995) |
| Posts: 341 | Location: Tarrant County, Texas | Registered: August 24, 2001 |  
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Administrator Member
| Don't forget that in 2003, the legislature overruled applicable caselaw and repealed the court-created "due diligence" requirement in probation revocation cases (see CCP Art. 42.12, Secs. 21(e) and 24). You might try arguing that the same logic applies in non-Art. 42.12 cases if you anticipate problems establishing due diligence in your particular case. |
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