Very often the owner of property seized under 59.03 does not reside in the county where it is seized (and suit filed). If that person must be served in accordance with Rule 106(a)(1), the Sheriff or Constable of the county where the notice of seizure is served will want to be paid. Yet, it is my understanding that those fees are normally submitted to the clerk to be collected as costs of suit (i.e., are not paid in advance). See Sweitzer, 881 S.W.2d at 766. Does art. 59.05(f) then later excuse the payment of the service fees in cases where it applies? If not, should the judgment specifically state which "court costs" must in fact be paid. And, if the property forfeited must first be converted to cash, is the payment of these fees delayed until that is accomplished? Do the answers to these questions depend in any way upon how the commissioner's court provides for collection of the fees in its orders under Loc.Govt.Code 118.131? Are sheriffs/constables willing to assist their fellow law enforcement agencies in other counties by not charging for these services? (That does not necessarily seem fair to the local taxpayers). The answers to these questions will determine how cost effective it is to pursue the smaller forfeiture cases.

How have you handled the situation where such "court costs" or fees are due, but no property is ultimately forfeited?

Are you referring to cases in which the value of the forfeited property is less than $2,500? I suppose there is an argument of some force by virtue of the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius that court costs are precluded in a sub-$2,500 case. This construction may be argued to be in some tension with section 154.004(d)(2) of the Local Government Code, which indicates that the preclusion of paying a fee for service to a district or county officer who is paid a salary does not preclude the state from paying costs in civil cases. Without doing further research, I think there's a fairly good chance that the "specific trumps general" provision of the Code Construction Act supports the "small claims exemption," to the extent chapter 59 is read to provide such a free pass. I dare not speculate on what the AG would say about it. But we don't handle chapter 59 cases, so what do I know anyway?