HB663 would provide that Counties can recover fees and costs in the same manner as a private litigant when recovering a debt in a court proceeding. I am confused as to how this would interact with TCPRC 38.001, the general attorney fee statute.

It may seem a bit redundant, but I don't foresee any significant impact. The probable effect, if any, would be that the new law would trump section 38.001 to the extent of any inconsistency since it is concerned solely with counties who are collecting a delinquent debt (as opposed to "a person" under section 38.001), ergo, it is the more specific provision under the purview of section 311.026(b) of the Government Code. Since the bill does not expressly waive sovereign immunity, it would seem to have no effect on potential county liability for attorney's fees. This is particularly true since counties are not "an individual or corporation" which is susceptible to liability for attorney's fees under section 38.001. Base-Seal, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 901 S.W.2d 783, 786-87 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1995, writ denied). In any event, most of the clowns who owe the county money aren't going to be any more able to satisfy an attorney's fee judgment than the underlying debt.

While the county is immune from paying under 38.001, can it collect under 38.001?

Certainly it was assumed by the Austin court that the county was a "person" who could recover such fees. 839 S.W.2d at 894. Does the proposed legislation include other types of claims than those mentioned in 38.001?

Its a little different. HB663. Thanks for the cite. I looked around but didn't find that one.

In a sense, the authorization for assessment of attorney's fees under the new bill is more expansive than section 38.001. Although judges and lawyers obliquely refer to section 38.001 as authority to award fees in claims for "debt," the statute actually provides only for recovery if the underlying claim was based on contract, a sworn account, services, labor or furnished materials. The bill, however, is expressly keyed to recovery of fees in a suit to collect a "debt." While some of the included examples are similar to the types of claims enumerated in section 38.001, others -- such as noncontractual interest, taxes, fees, penalties and a "claim on a judgment" [bond forfeitures, perhaps?] -- may not be completely consonant with the types of claims set forth in the general attorney's fee statute.

As an aside, the new bill provides that the fees and costs authorized may be recovered "in the same manner as provided by law for a private litigant." Would that mean that presentment [as required for a section 38.001 claim by section 38.002] is a condition precedent, that usual and customary fees are presumed and that such "usual and customary fees" may be the subject of judicial notice [per sections 38.003 and .004]? Certainly, sections 38.002-.004 "provide[] by law for a private litigant" the means by which attorney's fees may be recovered. I suppose costs would be recoverable by being the prevailing party. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 131.