Just when I thought I was beginning to understand Manuel, along comes McGee, No. 02-02-471/6-CR (11/06/03). Seems like the meaning of "determination to adjudicate" is as broad or as narrow as you want it to be. If you can challenge any matter connected with the procedure used to adjudicate, why not all such matters? I frankly have to doubt that McGee was concerned only about the absence of Lane at the sentencing phase of the proceeding, yet that is the only possible error that was not connected to the determination to adjudicate. Maybe this just points out that the Legislature likely did not intend the Kirtley-Lloyd exception to 5(b) (if its intent was to limit the number of revocation appeals and not just the number of issues in the brief). But, then I am left without an explanation for the provision that an appeal can continue as though time had stopped, since they must have meant that there was indeed something to appeal. If the appeal is to be limited, maybe better words could be found to describe its scope.

[This message was edited by Martin Peterson on 01-25-04 at .]