While one would likely never think Rule 49.7 would have any significance in a 3-judge court of appeals, turns out it does. As the opinion in Campbell, No. 10-01-233-CR ((01/14/04) illustrates, Rule 49.3 limits the decision on a motion for rehearing to being made by "a majority of the justices who participated in the decision of the case". Since Chief Justice Davis was no longer a member of the court and thus could not participate in ruling on the State's Motion for Rehearing (which was on file for many months before Davis resigned), it was overruled by operation of law (without the benefit of Justice Reyna's input). Had the State asked for a rehearing en banc, seems that Reyna would have been able to participate in the decision of the State's motion (and the outcome may have been altered). Of course, the rule says a majority of the court may vote to resubmit the case even without a motion from a party, so maybe the best interpretation is Reyna silently sided with Vance or at least did not think the case worthy of reconsideration. Maybe McLennan County will file a further motion for rehearing under Rule 49.5(c) (and ask that it be considered en banc).

Requesting reconsideration en banc has gotten to be too much of a mess to deal with. Ex parte Sierra, 2003 WL 22962350 (Tex.Crim.App.,2003.
Dec. 17, 2003) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("[Appellant] has fallen into a trap for the unwary in regard to motions for rehearing and motions for reconsideration en banc, a recurring problem. Motions for rehearing pursuant to Tex.R.App.P. 49.1 toll the time for filing a petition for discretionary review, but motions for reconsideration en banc pursuant to Tex.R.App.P. 49.7 do not.")