"Void" means that the "action was outside the parameters of any rule or procedure in place at that time." Seidel, 39 S.W.3d at 225. It is an interesting concept to me that although it has been said a void judgment is a nullity from the beginning and thus may be attacked either by direct appeal or collateral attack, a party loses its ability to attack a void order by mandamus if it fails to timely exercise the right to appeal from the order. State ex rel. De Leon, 89 S.W.3d 195. This seems troublesome when the right of appeal was not generally recognized. But, unfortunately it seems to be the established penalty for lack of diligence. See Watson, 795 S.W.2d at 310.

So, the question becomes: Can Mr. Cadriel be revoked for failing to comply with a void order? I have a similar situation where the court purported to grant a motion under art. 42.12 sec. 6 in a state jail felony case. No mention was made in the motion or the court's order of sec. 15(f)(2). I have formed the opinion that an invalid judgment or order is always subject to re-examination because to constitute a final judgment it is axiomatic that the decision must not be contrary to law. Hence, my thought (in my case) was to file a motion to set aside the void order as opposed to a motion to revoke (which the defendant has also now made available by his conduct). But does the trial court have authority to revise its void orders? Could the State appeal from the decision on the motion to set aside? Maybe my theory would work in Brownsville too.

In any event, thankfully it appears Cadriel will not be able to claim any credit against his sentence if and when he is revoked because he was the "moving factor" in his erroneous release. Moneyhun, 274 S.W.2d at 547; Adams, 610 S.W.2d 780.

[This message was edited by Martin Peterson on 01-19-03 at .]